Tuesday, October 5, 2010

The Physics of Christianity? (2): The Problem of Evil




The so-called "Problem of evil", which underscores the basis of theodicy, is perhaps the central reason why so many original religious believers become atheists. Their perennial question is: IF God is all loving and also infinite and all-powerful, why does he not choose to stop - or at least diminish evil- where and when it occurs? In the case of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, maybe that would have meant some level of interference that spared half those lives, as opposed to all perishing. In the case of the human evil of Hitler's holocaust, maybe enabling 1 million of the 6 million to survive, as opposed to 6 million dead. Since nothing stopped all that unfolding evil, the atheist conclusion is that there is nothing there in the first instance. People are indeed on their own, whether a massive earthquake strikes (as in Haiti) or in the case of a genocide. Thus, why the need to invoke a God?

Frank Tipler in his proposal for a "Physics of Christianity" comes at this from a totally novel direction, also different from that of Bernard Haisch (which I examined earlier), cf.:http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/04/bernard-haischs-god-theory-i.html and,

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/04/haisch-god-theory-ii-atheist-complaints.html

According to Tipler, in his chapter on the Problem of Evil:

"God is not powerless, and He does not lack foreknowledge. It seems He could have stopped the tsunami had He wished, or at least warned us had He wished. The question then is: Why did he not wish, if He indeed loves us as a Father? Many people resolve this conundrum by concluding that God does not exist. Indeed, this Problem of Evil is the main cause of atheism not only today but throughout history.

If God does exist there can be only one reason why He allows evil to exist: it is logically impossible for Him to remove all evil from reality. Even an omnipotent God cannot do what is logically impossible."

Now, WHY is it "logically impossible? for God to subdue evil? Inquring minds want to know! From physics, actually the same advanced physics as postulated by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mludnow in their book, The Grand Design, Tipler postulates the multiverse concept. In the multiverse (see diagram) there are an infinite number of parallel universes which I already described in technical detail here:

http://brane-space.blogspot.com/2010/09/more-on-multi-verse-concept.html

Note, and this is very important, the version of multiverse portrayed above derives from Hawking's and Mludnow's proposal that via D-brane interactions in the initial (negative energy) vacuum other universes are also spawned especially as part of the exponential cosmic inflation phase of expansion (see, e.g. 'What is the Multiverse?') p. 44, in Scientific American, January, 2010). This is very important, for this version of the multiverse is distinct from Tipler's which invokes the "Many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics. Thus, while Hawking and Mludnow's basis derives from the vacuum expansion or cosmological dynamics, Tipler's derives from one of several quantum mechanics' interpretations (more on this later- but I don't want to seriously break readers' trains of thought now!)

In Tipler's words, as per his multiverse (p. 239):

"In the multiverse, all universes consistent with physical law actually exist. All human-caused evils could have been avoided, beause human-caused decisions to act one way or another are only made after the constraints of physical law are taken into account. ....Therefore, there is a universe in which Hitler never rose to power and the Holocaust never happened. There is a universe where none of the evil empires that have murdered people in our universe ever arose. There is no evidence that any human caused evil is required by physical law.

Therefore, there is at least one universe in which no human evil ever occurred....Evil arose on Earth much earlier than the human species, so that it was present by the time of the Cambrian Explosion. So we can apply the same argument to nonhuman beings and conclude there must be a universe in which no evil caused by living things ever arose"


These are weighty remarks indeed! Because, if true, it means that one of the infinite number of parallel universes is and remains totally perfect: the "Garden of Eden" of Genesis myth, or in Tipler's words "the best of all possible worlds (universes)". Of course, in this "best universe", there'd be no need for a Savior, since no "sin-ransom" sacrifice would be required, as the universe is already entirely perfect!

Tipler's next question is logical and one any atheist would ask (ibid.):

"The question then is 'Why didn't God limit His creation to this best of all possible universes, which does in fact exist'?"

He goes on to address it by pointing out the answer is connected to the even more fundamental question: "Why did God (the Cosmological Singularity) create even one universe, much less the multiverse?"

Of course, this returns to the fundamental Leibniz paradox of why there is something rather than nothing? For if "nothing" - meaning only the perfect God in a physical vacuum - be the more perfect state, why add imperfection via creation to it, even if the imperfection is effectively fractional. Tipler's answer is:

"Because He created the universe as an object for His love".

To this end then, he not only created a universe but a multiverse. Thus:

"not only did He create some creatures but He created all possible creatures that could fit"

Thus, in a multiverse, there is no reason why all possible plants and animals - as well as all possible humans - must exist! As well as all possible planets, both perfect (no earthquakes, or tidal waves, or massive destructive storms, tornoadoes) and imperfect ...with all the preceding. Of course, all possible humans encompasses evil ones as well, so following Tipler's logic, it is irrefutable that evil humans had to exist in at least one of the infinite universes, and it happens that is ours! There is no possibility that all the infinite universes or cosmi could not include at least one version permeated with evil. The reason is that in a multiverse situation all the possibilities must come forth. None can be precluded!

Tipler doesn't use the word "evil" as an absolute objective entity, but rather as synonymous with the more objective term, "disabled". And he notes that just as a loving parent loves all his children, including the disabled, so also the God of the multiverse loves all his universes, including the disabled ones. (Of course, there may be other universes more disabled than ours, or less!)

As Tipler puts it: "He loves the universes in which evil never appeared, as well as those in which it did"

He must love all because his creation mandate enabled all.

More importantly (p. 263), having a subset of "evil" or "disabled" universes allowed for divine expression, to assume a human (or alien-form, i.e. incarnation) to undergo death and resurrection in order to save the humans on that world, or in that universe. Thus, in Tipler's words: "the Cross would be necessary in a universe of maximum potential, which necessarily means allowing evil to exist".

But one can also look at this from a bit different perspective: that it is, the disabled universes in their imperfection act as "energizers" to allow the goody-two shoes variants to exist! I mean, without these energizer-"evil" cosmi, there'd be no reason for divine incarnation which is the effective substrate (according to Tipler) to actually imbue the multiverse with direct divine energy! A good analogy is the Star Trek episode that showed Kirk split by a transporter accident into evil and wholly good personae. Once split, the evil persona went on numerous rampages and was uncontrollable, while the "good" Kirk withered, becoming passive, never engaging in or doing anything. In other words, the "evil" Kirk was necessary to energize and restore the 'good" Kirk to functionality. In the same way, one might argue the "evil" universes of the multiverse are essential to preserve its full functionality. Kind of like a bi-polar dynamo!

What is another feature of dynamic universes? Well, as the philosopher N.M. Wildiers pointed out, they EVOLVE! The very nature of evolution is a dynamic process, whereas if a universe were wholly "good" there'd be no need to evolve! It would already have peaked at some level of "perfection". But as Wildiers added: "An evolving universe and a perfect universe are mutually contradictory, because evil is part and parcel of a world or universe in evolution". That is one of the most profound insights there is, and that anyone can have, though doubtless most theists would look askance at it.


Now, some problems!

The major one is an error all too frequent nowadays, which is to conflate the Many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, with the multiverse concept of cosmology. The 'Many worlds' interpretation of QM is NOT THE SAME as the multiverse theory. The former refers to the infinite quantum state potentialities attendant on an observation or measurement, which according to Eugene Everett (the original proponent) causes the universe to "split" into infinite independent "realties" in which alternative outcomes are played out. Meanwhile, the latter refers to actual alternative universes separated by small differentials of space-time, particle embodiments, physical constants etc.. The cosmological multiverse, in other words, is not contingent on any human observations or measurements to manifest, while the multi-"worlds" ("universes" - but really quantum probability states) of Many worlds are.

The problem is that the "many worlds" interpretation (orginally devised by Hugh Everett, in 1957) breaks down by virtue of its own excesses! Thus, in its original form as enunciated by Everett (which I take to be the only honest form) an infinite number of "universes" (engendered by an actual observation, say of an electron hitting a screen) each splits into infinitely more universes each second! This contrasts with the actual multiverse postulate, in which an infinite number of parallel universes are engendered by brane collisions and exponential inflation, but these remain a unitary stability - as shown in the diagram - they don't subsequently split into secondary or tertiary infinites in a never-ending regression.

Thus, a quantum construct is being confused with a macroscopic one by Tipler. How does this affect his whole interpretation? Well, in principle it doesn't, since the macroscopic multiverse (spawned by the original cosmic vacuum) can still be one in which infinitely diverse potentialities arise, or as the Star Trek mantra goes: Infinite diversity in infinite combinations. Thus, again, it is reasonable to suppose there are universes in which the JFK assassination never occurred - and Lee Harvey Oswald was a hero who prevented it, and also no Hitler or Holocaust occurred, nor the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami killing over 200,000. In like manner, there will be universes where John McCain was elected instead of Obama in 2008, and one in which mass alien invasions transpire on Earth in 2010.

Thus there can still be all potentials realized, including a perfect universe, and less less than perfect ones, such as ours. But ALL are essential to the integral operation of the multiverse.

Last, I want to deal with Tipler's claim that his 'many worlds' version of QM "must" be the one because otherwise one would require an outside deity to observe the cosmos, to make it go into superpositions. However, if a holographic principle applies (as shown by David Bohm in his book, Wholeness and the Implicate Order), then the sentient observers within the multiverse itself would be capable of engendering any superpositions. This would include a superposition of the entire universe via the collective holographic action -consciousness of its sentient participants.

Once again, one can say that such superpositions are a direct result of a specific feature of a certain subset of the multiverse in which one can have mutually interfering observables. Most often these would emerge when the condition of non-zero Poisson brackets enters, via non-commuting variables x, p:

[x, p] = -i h/ 2 pi

where h is the Planck constant of action. If two variables a, b commute, then one has:

[a, b] = (a*b - b*a) = 0

if not, then: [a,b] = (a*b - b*a) = -1

and we say a and b are 'non-commuting'.

On inspection, it makes sense the non-commuting case ([a*b]=0) would apply to the perfect universes, and the latter, to the imperfect ones. Correspondingly, these are also the ones for which the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle would apply! (Also known as the "Principle of Tolerance" in the words of Jacob Bronowksi).

Would tolerance be needed in a perfect universe? Doubtful! However, it is needed in those less than perfect ones that comprise the multiverse, like ours. Maybe this is the feature that really escaped Tipler.

Next: How demons, "Satan" and Hell enter Tipler's Physics!

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